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Abstract
We analyze an OLG economy with ﬁnancial frictions and accumulation of both
physical and intangible capital. The key diﬀerence between these two types of capital
is that intangible capital cannot be used as collateral for borrowing. As intangibles
become more important relative to physical capital in production, interest rates decline,
creating the conditions for the emergence of rational bubbles in equilibrium. The model
predicts that the dynamics of capital accumulation in developed economies together
with the low pledgeability of intangible capital induces an abundance of low-yield assets
and a scarcity of high-yield ones. In our view, this is an important mechanism behind
the long-lasting sequence of asset price bubbles observed in the last decades. Our
paper stresses this relative imbalance and links it to purely technological factors. We
also analyze the question of dynamic eﬃciency, demonstrating that, in the presence
of ﬁnancial frictions, neither the interest rate test nor the test proposed by Abel et
al. (1989) are appropriate. Finally we show that, in general, rational bubbles are not
Pareto improving in our framework.
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1 Introduction
There is enormous fascination among economists by the topic of asset price bubbles, both
at the theoretical and practical level. This is attested by the large volume of studies on the
subject, recently surveyed in Brunnermeier (2009). Yet, our knowledge about the causes and
consequences of these important phenomena is still limited. The recent boom and bust of
the housing sector in the United States and its widespread eﬀects worldwide warn us about
the importance of understanding why bubbles emerge, how they gain momentum and ﬁnally
why they burst. An important open question in the literature is whether there are structural
conditions in the global economy stimulating the creation of bubbles and, if that is the case,
what governments should do.
The central contribution of our paper is to highlight that the dynamics of capital accu-
mulation in developed countries might have induced a shortage of high-yield ﬁnancial assets
and a surplus of low-yield securities in capital markets, creating the conditions for the exis-
tence of asset price bubbles. Our theory builds on the fact that, in the recent decades, the
importance of intangible capital – research and development (R&D), information technology,
advertising, ﬁrm-brand, etc. – has increased relative to physical capital as an input in the
production processes of advanced economies. By its very nature, intangible capital is not as
good a source of collateral as tangibles. Other things equal, a higher dependence on intan-
gibles distorts the economy’s ability to issue ﬁnancial assets in order to borrow funds and
invest, aﬀecting the mix of stores of value available to investors. The resulting scarcity of
high-yield securities is the key mechanism to sustain bubbly equilibria.
More speciﬁcally, we analyze an OLG economy in which entrepreneurs raise funds to invest
both in physical and intangible capital. Due to a simple moral hazard problem, borrowing
requires collateral, which can only be provided by physical capital. As the importance of in-
tangibles in production grows relative to tangibles, entrepreneurs face a harder time supplying
assets in order to raise funds to invest in intangible capital. Since, in equilibrium, savings
are to be invested, they end up ﬁnancing an over-accumulation of physical structures. In
turn, the high stock of physical capital drives down its marginal productivity, reducing the
interest rate faced by lenders. Under those circumstances, rational bubbles can be sustained
in equilibrium1.
From a methodological perspective, the present paper is closely related to a recent strand
1Our focus on rational bubbles is not meant to fully capture the pattern of speculation in ﬁnancial assets
observed in reality. We restrict the analysis to fully rational environments because they impose more discipline
on the researcher: intuitively, the conditions for rational bubbles are more stringent than those for behavioral
ones. This, in a certain sense, reinforces the main ﬁndings in the paper. If technological evolution and the
consequent relative asset shortage are capable of inducing bubbles even in fully rational environments, it is
not hard to imagine that they can do even more once investors are allowed to make systematic mistakes.
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of literature in economics suggesting that speculative bubbles and other important phenom-
ena2 result from a chronic problem of asset shortage in the world economy. According to
Caballero (2006) “Asset supply is having a hard time keeping up with the global demand for
stores of value and collateral by households, corporations, governments, insurance companies,
and ﬁnancial intermediaries more broadly”. A simple consequence of this mismatch between
supply and demand is price appreciation, inducing speculation and the frequent occurrence
of bubbles. If this is actually the case, one wonders why the world economy would be unable
to increase the supply of assets at the same pace as demand for them rises.
Caballero et al. (2006) and Caballero et al. (2008a, 2008b) provide an answer. The
authors argue that heterogeneity in the degree of ﬁnancial development across countries
coupled with the fast growth and high savings rates in developing economies are at the root
of the matter. These fast growing and high savings areas have accumulated substantial wealth
in the recent decades, increasing their demand for stores of value. Because ﬁnancial markets
and legal institutions in general are less developed in these regions, the issuance of new assets
to accommodate the increased demand has not grown fast enough. In stylized theoretical
contexts, this phenomenon results in the existence of equilibria featuring rational bubbles3.
We shift the focus of the analysis in two important dimensions. First, we emphasize that
the crucial aspect of the problem is not an absolute shortage of stores of value, but instead a
relative scarcity of high-yield securities and an abundance of low-yield ones. Second, we claim
that at least in part the source of this imbalance is found in the developed nations whose
production processes rely extensively on intangible capital. This, in a certain sense, addresses
an important criticism to the asset shortage literature, which falls short in explaining why
the highly developed ﬁnancial markets of advanced economies would be unable to properly
accommodate the inﬂow of savings from emerging countries. In our model, we show that
advanced economies can in fact absorb the excess savings from abroad. The central issue is
that they can only do so by over-investing in relatively unproductive assets, since frictions
prevent an eﬃcient allocation of funds.
Another diﬀerence of our model relative to most previous papers is that we consider a
production technology that displays declining marginal productivity of factors. This is not
a minor technical extension but instead is an important part of our analysis. The existing
models of asset shortage have relied extensively on linear technologies with marginal produc-
tivities that are forced to be higher than the equilibrium interest rate lenders face. Because of
asymmetric information, any additional funds can only partly be used for productive invest-
ment, creating a gap between the supply and demand for stores of value, which provides the
2Caballero et al. (2008a) study the topic of global imbalances.
3Mendoza and Rios-Rull (2008) present a model with similar predictions.
3conditions for the emergence of bubbles. In our model, on the contrary, lenders can always
allocate their funds to real investments. However, after a certain point, moral hazard con-
straints become relevant and savings can only be channeled to the accumulation of physical
capital, driving down its marginal productivity and the rate of interest creditors obtain.
The downward pressure on interest rates is the key mechanism linking technological ad-
vances to bubbles in our paper. As pointed out by Tirole (1985) and Santos and Woodford
(1997), the low interest rate is a necessary condition for equilibria featuring rational bubbles
when information is symmetric. In the OLG model of Tirole, for example, rational bubbles
require the equilibrium interest rate to be below the growth rate of the economy in steady-
state, which was traditionally interpreted as a sign of dynamic ineﬃciency resulting from the
over-accumulation of capital.
This close connection between rational bubbles and ineﬃciency has been a source of crit-
icism to models of rational bubbles. For instance, the classical paper of Abel, Mankiw, Sum-
mers and Zeckhauser (1989) – henceforth AMSZ – provides evidence that actual economies
are not ineﬃcient. More speciﬁcally, AMSZ compared the inﬂow versus the outﬂow of funds
from the corporate sectors of OECD economies and found that they consistently generate
more resources than what they absorb, a clear sign of eﬃciency. Moreover, in the context of
their paper, AMSZ prove that their empirical test is equivalent to the interest rate criterion
in Tirole’s economy. However, in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, the link between inter-
est rates and dynamic eﬃciency is severed, as shown by Woodford (1990), Farhi and Tirole
(2008), and Martin and Ventura (2011). These papers demonstrate that economies which
are eﬃcient according to the AMSZ criterion can sustain rational bubbles in equilibrium.
Our paper builds extensively on this result, combining it with the role of intangible capi-
tal. In particular, we prove that, in our framework, the parameter space displays a separation
into two mutually exclusive and complementary regions according to the importance of in-
tangibles relative to physical capital. When intangible capital has little importance, rational
bubbles cannot exist unless the bubbleless economy fails the AMSZ empirical benchmark.
As intangibles become more relevant, on the other hand, rational bubbles can always be
sustained in equilibrium. Hence, technological evolution moves the economy into a bubbly
region and yet allows it to be productive, in accordance with the existing evidence. The
reason why our model passes the AMSZ test despite the low interest rate is that the high
stock of physical capital makes intangibles highly productive.
We also contribute to the literature on dynamic eﬃciency, complementing the previous
papers and formally proving that, in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, not only the interest
rate but also the AMSZ test of dynamic eﬃciency is not appropriate. Despite our stylized
framework, we argue this result is much more general. Financial frictions create hetero-
4geneity in the investment opportunities that diﬀerent individuals face over their lifetime,
and introduce an additional margin to improve allocations. Building on this intuition, we
demonstrate that the AMSZ test is not equivalent to dynamic eﬃciency, even when potential
reallocations are required to obey the existing ﬁnancial constraints. In spite of that, we argue
that rational asset price bubbles are not Pareto improving because they cannot replicate the
type of reallocation that we propose.
Our paper is part of a broader literature on the interaction between bubbles and economic
growth. Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993), and Olivier (2000), for
example, analyze models of endogenous growth due to externalities in the accumulation of
capital. In these papers, production externalities create a wedge between the private and
social rates of return on investments, allowing for bubbly equilibria. Our work assumes no
externalities but instead focuses on the role of ﬁnancial frictions as the source of wedges that
permit the co-existence of rational bubbles and eﬃciency in the AMSZ sense.
Similarly to the present paper, other authors have studied the role of frictions in capital
markets and their interaction with bubbles as well. Woodford (1990), Farhi and Tirole (2008)
and Martin and Ventura (2011) demonstrate how bubbles can arise to relax borrowing con-
straints. Contrary to ours, these papers feature one type of capital with limited pledgeability.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Lorenzoni (2008) study the macroeconomic implications of
ﬁnancial frictions, through the ﬂuctuation in the value of collateral and ﬁre-sale externalities.
These papers focus on the additional macroeconomic volatility stemming from incomplete
risk sharing, whereas we concentrate on the eﬀect of frictions on capital accumulation and
bubbles.
Several studies have analyzed rational bubbles in the context of asymmetric information,
where the existence of the bubble is not common knowledge (Allen, Morris and Postlewaite
(1993), Conlon (2004)) or where speculators are more informed than their investors (Allen
and Gorton (1993), Allen and Gale (2000), Barlevy (2008)). Harrison and Kreps (1978)
and Sheinkman and Xiong (2003), on the other hand, focus on the interaction between
heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints, which increase the value of assets beyond
fundamentals thanks to the option to sell them in the future to agents with diﬀerent be-
liefs. Our model is distinct from those since both the information structure and beliefs are
symmetric.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the evidence on the
increased importance of intangible capital and the role of collateral and ﬁnancing constraints.
Section 3 presents the model, while Section 4 characterizes its multiple dynamic equilibria.
Section 5 builds on the technical results derived before to expose our connection between
technological progress and bubbles. Section 6 discusses the subject of dynamic eﬃciency
5and presents some positive and normative considerations regarding bubbles, while Section 7
concludes.
2 Evidence on Intangible Capital and Financing Con-
straints
There are two central assumptions in our model. First, in a sense to be made clear below,
we postulate that intangible capital has become more important relative to physical capital
in the production processes of developed countries. Second, we assume that physical cap-
ital is a better source of collateral compared to intangibles, and therefore determines the
entrepreneurs’ ability to borrow funds and invest. In what follows, we discuss several papers
that present evidence supporting these two hypotheses.4
2.1 The Increased Importance of Intangible Capital
A building block in the model we present later is the technology entrepreneurs use to produce





where A is a measure of productivity, k represents physical capital, z represents intangi-
ble capital and l stands for labor. Several papers have employed similar versions of this
speciﬁcation to analyze the eﬀects of intangible capital.
McGrattan and Prescott (2007) adopt an identical technology to evaluate the ability of
the otherwise conventional neoclassical growth model to account for the business cycle in the
U.S. economy during the 1990s. The authors show that including intangibles signiﬁcantly
improves the performance of the calibrated model. Hall (2000) introduces the concept of E-
capital as an input for ﬁnal production, which for many purposes is equivalent to our notion
of intangibles. Relying on a non-parametric approach to calculate the stock of E-capital, Hall
claims it might be an important common element behind events in the U.S. stock and labor
markets in the 1990s.
In competitive equilibria the exponents of the Cobb-Douglas production function repre-
sent the share of total income that accrues to each factor. This is a measure of the importance
of each factor for production, and it is the one we use in the paper. Hence, the notion that the
4As it will become clear in the next Section, we make several additional assumptions in order to obtain
closed form expressions and to illustrate the main theoretical results in the paper. We emphasize such
assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity and are by no means crucial to obtain the intuition behind
our ﬁndings. What is central is the increased importance of intangibles relative to tangibles and the interaction
between the low collateralizability of intangibles and the borrowing constraints.
6importance of intangible capital has increased over time relative to physical capital trans-
lates, in our paper, in an increase of  relative to . Note that this assumption is not
equivalent to saying that the stock of z has increased more than the stock of k, because such
a movement could result from diﬀerences in initial conditions and general equilibrium eﬀects,
even without any change in the structure of the production function. The statement that 
has increased relative to  is essentially an assumption about a change in the nature of the
production process in developed countries. Interestingly, we ﬁnd strong evidence suggesting
this is actually the case.
Corrado et al. (2006) carefully measure the share of output that is earned by the owners
of intangibles in the United States. Their deﬁnition of investment in intangible capital
includes expenses on ﬁrm brand, ﬁrm-speciﬁc resources, scientiﬁc and non-scientiﬁc R&D
and computerized information. Using data on national accounts and estimates presented
in Corrado et al. (2005), the authors show that investment on intangibles has increased
substantially in the recent decades, much more so than investment in physical capital.
More importantly, their calculations indicate that the fraction of non-farm business output
in the United States accruing to intangible capital has increased from 9.4% on average in the
1973-1995 period to approximately 14% in the 1995-2003 period. They also estimate that,
if one focuses exclusively on the years 2000-2003, the share of income earned by the owners
of intangible capital reaches 15%, while the owners of physical capital obtain 25% and the
remaining 60% is absorbed by labor. Since there is no evidence that the share of income
earned by physical capital has increased, when translated to our model, these results conﬁrm
the notion that the ratio

 has increased in the United States in the last decades . At the
same time, the data also point to a general shift of production from labor to capital (an
increase in  + ). Table 1 summarizes this information.
Belhocine (2008) reproduces Corrado et al. (2006) and ﬁnds qualitatively similar evidence
for Canada, where estimated investment in intangibles has become as large as the investment
in physical capital. Fukao et al. (2007) and Marrano and Haskel (2006) present similar
ﬁndings for Japan and the United Kingdom respectively.
2.2 Intangible Capital, Collateral and Financing Constraints
Collateral is an important instrument for borrowers to raise funds in imperfect capital mar-
kets. Moral hazard and adverse selection reduce lenders willingness to allocate capital to
borrowers whose quality or actions are not completely observable. Collateral plays an im-
portant role in overcoming this failure since it allows lenders to seize assets in the event of
default. Moreover, it increases the incentives of borrowers to be diligent and perform well.
As emphasized by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), what turns an asset into good collateral
7is its redeployability in the contingency of liquidation. In other words, good collateral is an
asset which can be costlessly seized and sold in the market for a price similar to its value in
the ﬁrst best use. There is ample empirical evidence associating redeployability of collateral
and access to ﬁnancing. Benmelech et al. (2005) show that increased redeployability of
commercial real state increases the duration of mortgages, reduces the cost of borrowing and
increases the loan-to-value ratio. Benmelech (2009) shows that leverage was associated with
redeployability of assets for U.S. railroads in the 19th century, while Benmelech and Bergman
(2008) estimate the impact of collateral redeployability on airline companies’ bargaining
power during episodes of ﬁnancial duress.
Intangible capital is, in general, a worse source of collateral compared to physical capital.
First and foremost, intangible capital is, by its very nature, hard if not impossible to seize.
Furthermore, it is fundamentally intrinsic to the ﬁrm or business that produced it. Even
if in some cases lenders can obtain control over the intangibles of defaulting borrowers, the
redeployability of these assets tend to be small since their value in alternative uses is reduced
by the lack of speciﬁc knowledge or competences. Obviously, diﬀerent sorts of physical capital
suﬀer, to some extent, of the same problems.5 However, plants, equipment and machines are
generally accepted by ﬁnancial intermediaries as collateral for lending.
The second fundamental assumption in our paper builds on this reasoning to argue that,
other things equal, the more ﬁrms rely on intangible capital the more the ﬁnancing con-
straints bind. Several studies have documented this fact. Aghion et al. (2007) show that
R&D investment correlates with ﬁnancing constraints in a large sample of French ﬁrms. Car-
penter and Petersen (2002) ﬁnd that small high-tech U.S. ﬁrms suﬀer more from ﬁnancing
constraints. Canepa and Stoneman (2008) present similar evidence for ﬁrms in the United
Kingdom.
3 Model
3.1 The OLG Structure
The economy is represented by an overlapping-generation (OLG) model with one ﬁnal good
(y) and three inputs: labor (l); physical capital (k), and intangible capital (z). At every
period t, a new unit-measure generation is born with an endowment of 1 unit of time and
no endowment of goods. Each generation is composed by a fraction  of entrepreneurs and
a fraction 1    of households. Individuals live for three periods: young, middle age, and
old. They only consume when old. All individuals will try to use at best production and
5As exempliﬁed by Shleifer and Vishny(1992), a satellite, which is formally considered physical capital,
has low redeployability and does not constitute good collateral.
8investment opportunities during their lifetime to convert the initial endowment of time into
end-of-life consumption. For simplicity, we assume there is no uncertainty in the economy.
Figure 1 illustrates the model by describing the evolution of the generation born at time
t. When young, both households and entrepreneurs supply labor inelastically to the existing
ﬁrms run by the middle-aged entrepreneurs of generation t 1 in a competitive labor market.
The labor services are paid only at the beginning of period t + 1, at a wage rate w(t + 1).
The labor supply of the young will represent the aggregate labor supply of the economy in
each period.
At the beginning of period t+1, households have no option but to lend their accumulated
labor income at a gross rate R(t + 2) – to be paid at date t + 2 – to the contemporaneous
entrepreneurs in order to transfer funds to the last period of life. Hence, at date t + 2, a
household of generation t consumes her total wealth, represented by w(t + 1)R(t + 2), and
then dies.
Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, have diﬀerent investment opportunities. They use
their own funds and borrow additional resources from the contemporaneous households to
accumulate physical and intangible capital. They combine accumulated capital with labor
services from the newborn of generation t+1 to produce ﬁnal goods. Production by generation
t takes place between periods t + 1 and t + 2 and generates output of the ﬁnal good at the
beginning of time t+2, denoted yt (t + 2). Note that yt (t + 2) refers to the output produced
by a single entrepreneur.
Finally, at date t+2, the total output produced by generation t is distributed among the
owners of the factors. Part of it goes to the old households of generation t who lent funds to
the entrepreneurs. Another part remunerates the labor services provided by generation t+1.
The remaining output is retained by the old entrepreneurs of generation t, who consume and
die.
3.2 Production and Financial Frictions
Each middle-aged entrepreneur of generation t has access to a Cobb-Douglas production
technology that combines physical capital k, intangible capital z and labor l as follows
yt (t + 2) = A(t + 2)kt (t + 1)
 zt (t + 1)
 lt (t + 1)
1   (2)
where A is a productivity parameter that grows at the constant rate n and lt (t + 1) represents
the individual demand for labor in period t + 1. At the beginning of t + 1, a typical middle-
aged entrepreneur uses her own funds w(t + 1) and borrows additional resources dt (t + 1)
to accumulate zt (t + 1) and kt (t + 1). This is the ﬁrst stage of production. In a second
9and ﬁnal stage6, she hires labor from the newborn of generation t + 1. After production is
completed, both k and z fully depreciate. The marginal rate of transformation of ﬁnal goods
into k and z equals 1.
We introduce a friction in the lending process by allowing entrepreneurs to default on
their debt. In particular, we make the following assumptions. First, in the initial stage of
production, an entrepreneur can default on her debt, close the ﬁrm, and bring with her all
intangible capital z she has accumulated.7 In this case, the lender will seize the physical
capital that has been pledged for the loan. Once she defaults on the debt, the entrepreneur
can open a new ﬁrm, borrow funds from another lender, and start production (of course, she
might choose to default again). Second, after production is completed, the lender can seize
output y, provided the original ﬁrm has not been closed. This ensures repayment of the loan
once production is completed.8 Third, we assume that during the ﬁrst stage of production,
the lender has the ability to determine how the funds will be utilized by the borrower. This
captures the fact that lenders frequently monitor the use borrowers make of loaned funds,
and covenants specify the allocation of the resources they provide.9
Given these assumptions, it is clear that when loans are made, the lender will always
require them to be completely invested in and backed by tangible capital. If any part of the
loan was used to invest in intangibles, the entrepreneur would have the incentive to close
the ﬁrm, keeping the intangible capital accumulated, and open a new ﬁrm with another
lender who would lend to her against physical capital only. When the entrepreneur receives
a loan backed by tangible capital, she has no incentive to default before production, because
the tangible capital would be seized by the lender. Nor has she incentive to default after
production occurs, because the lender can seize the output of production. Finally, note
that competition among lenders implies that the return on these loans equals the marginal
productivity of tangible capital.
Under those assumptions, we have:
Lemma 1. Borrowing requires collateral in the form of physical capital. In other words,
before investing, each middle-aged entrepreneur of generation t faces the following borrowing
constraint:
dt (t + 1)  kt (t + 1) (3)
6Note that both stages happen between periods t + 1 and t + 2.
7This assumption is invoked to capture the fact that, in reality, intangible capital is intrinsic to the
entrepreneur who accumulates it and has low redeployability value for third parties.
8Note that capital fully depreciates so it cannot be used to ensure repayment after production.
9Often, loans are explicitly tied to particular uses, as in the case of commercial or residential mortgages.
10Hence, the problem of a middle-aged entrepreneur of generation t can be written as
max(k;z;l;d) fyt (t + 2)   R(t + 2)dt (t + 1)   w(t + 2)lt (t + 1)g
s:t:
kt (t + 1) + zt (t + 1)  w(t + 1) + dt (t + 1)
dt (t + 1)  kt (t + 1)
Since the ﬁrst constraint always binds in equilibrium, the borrowing restriction can be
rewritten as
zt (t + 1)  w(t + 1) (4)
Simply put, the possibility of default together with the lack of pledgeability implies that
intangible capital is ﬁnanced with internal funds only.
In our model, we assume that entrepreneurs cannot issue equity in order to invest, but are
constrained to issue collateralized debt only.10 The crucial aspect here is not the distinction
between debt and equity ﬁnancing, but rather the asymmetry between inside and outside
investors. In this respect, physical capital works as a mechanism through which managers
commit not to expropriate investors, a property that cannot be mimicked by intangible
capital.
It is useful to compare the assumptions above with the environment of other papers.
Martin and Ventura (2011), for example, prevent borrowing by the agents with better in-
vestment opportunities relative to their peers due to an “unspeciﬁed market imperfection”.
Lorenzoni (2008) introduces limited risk-sharing by assuming that entrepreneurs can default
after they produce, losing part of the output and remaining capital. Because we assume
limited pledgeability of only one type of capital, in our model the default decision must be
allowed to happen when K and Z are still diﬀerentiated. This is in fact similar to Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), where the borrower can close the ﬁrm and take away his human capital
at any time, leaving behind the land (the tangible part). In their model, if the borrower
defaults before production is completed, output is not produced and the unutilized land is
seized and sold by the lenders on the market; therefore, creditors will make sure that the
total amount to be repayed is at most as high as the future value of the land. In our model,
lenders can seize physical capital and transfer it to another producer if default occurs, so the
outside value of the collateral is kt (t + 1), while the present value of promised repayment is
10Implicitly, this assumption captures the idea that equity issuance is more exposed to asymmetric infor-
mation and adverse selection problems compared to debt issuance, a fact that has been widely discussed in
the corporate ﬁnance literature (Mayers and Majluf (1984) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
11dt (t + 1), resulting in Lemma 1.11
4 Existence and Characterization of Equilibria
This Section proves the existence and characterizes the dynamic competitive equilibria of the
model. In what follows, aggregate variables are denoted by upper case letters. For instance,
the aggregate output of generation t is given by Yt(t + 2) = yt(t + 2). Moreover, because
labor is supplied inelastically every period, we omit the individual labor supply – which is
normalized to 1.
4.1 The Bubbleless Economy
A bubbleless competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition. The sequence of allocations
flt (t + 1);kt (t + 1);zt (t + 1);dt (t + 1)g
1
t=0
constitutes a dynamic bubbleless competitive equilibrium of the economy if there
exists a sequence of price vectors fw(t + 1);R(t + 1)g
1
t=0 such that, at each t:
 Each agent is maximizing her utility subject to her budget constraint.
 The labor market clears: 1 = Lt (t + 1) = lt (t + 1).
 The savings market clears: w(t + 1) = Kt (t + 1)+Zt (t + 1) = (kt (t + 1)+zt (t + 1)).
Solving in closed-form for the equilibrium is possible because of the simplifying assumptions
we have made. When young, agents supply labor inelastically. When middle-aged, households
supply their savings to the entrepreneurs inelastically as well.12 Only entrepreneurs take
active decisions, and they coincide with proﬁt maximization for the ﬁrm. Therefore, the
equilibrium wage and interest rate are determined by the F.O.Cs of the ﬁrm:
w(t + 2) = (1      )
yt (t + 2)
lt (t + 1)
= (1      )Yt (t + 2) (5)
11In other words, since a unit of capital seized by the lender will be lent to another entrepreneur in a loan
backed by tangible capital, the t+2 outside value of capital – the revenue it will generate at t+2 under the
alternative use – is kt(t + 1)R(t + 2), while the promised repayment is dt(t + 1)R(t + 2). The comparison
between the two again reduces to equation (3).
12The model can also be solved in closed form if households have log utility of consumption in diﬀerent
periods. All the results derived below are valid under this more general context, apart of a renormalization
of parameters. The proof of this claim is available upon request.
12R(t + 2) = 
yt (t + 2)
kt (t + 1)
= 
Yt (t + 2)
Kt (t + 1)
(6)
where Kt(t + 1) = kt(t + 1).
Two markets are open in period t+1. One is the market for labor, in which the young of
generation t+1 supply labor to generation t’s ﬁrms. We have already imposed its equilibrium
condition above. The other market is the one for savings which achieves equilibrium when:
Kt(t + 1) + Zt(t + 1) = w(t + 1) = (1      )Yt 1(t + 1) (7)
The borrowing constraint (whose Lagrangian multiplier we label t referring to generation
t)
zt(t + 1)  w(t + 1) (8)
coupled with the optimal choice of intangible capital by entrepreneurs implies:




t [zt(t + 1)   w(t + 1)] = 0 (10)
t  0 (11)
These conditions show that, whenever the ﬁnancing constraint binds, the marginal pro-
ductivity of intangible capital is higher than the interest rate prevailing in the market for
funds, which in equilibrium equals the marginal productivity of physical capital. We call that
shadow rate of return IRR, to stress that it is the return an additional dollar could generate
if freely transferred to an entrepreneur. Note that
IRR(t + 2)   R(t + 2) = t (12)
so t captures the spread between the return on a unit of internal funds and the return on a
unit of funds raised through collateralized debt.
While analyzing equilibrium allocations, we focus exclusively on the aggregate variables
(Y;K;Z) and on the prices (w;R). There is no loss of generality in doing so. Knowing the
path of these aggregates is enough to fully describe the economy, since all other variables are
immediately derived from them.
13In order to characterize the behavior of the economy along an equilibrium path, it is nec-
essary to determine under what conditions the borrowing constraint binds. Fortunately, the
model features an interesting separation of the parameter space into two mutually exclusive
and complementary regions, one where the constraint always binds and another where it
never does. The next deﬁnition sets the stage for the formal proof of this result.
Deﬁnition. Let  = f(;;;n) : (;;) 2 (0;1)3;0 < + < 1;0 < ng be the parameter
space in the model. Deﬁne two subsets:
B =













Note that  = B [ NB and B \ NB =  .
Proposition 1 builds on this deﬁnition to analyze the existence of a dynamic bubbleless
equilibrium. It is straightforward to show that, if a steady-state exists, all real variables must
grow at the rate
(1 + g) = (1 + n)
1
1   (13)
Proposition 1. There always exists a trivial equilibrium in which K;Z; andY are equal to
zero. Moreover:
- If (;;;n) 2 B the ﬁnancing constraint is binding along all equilibrium paths. The
economy has a unique non-trivial bubbleless globally stable steady-state (where the borrowing
constraint binds).
- If (;;;n) 2 NB the ﬁnancing constraint is slack along all equilibrium paths. The
economy has a unique non-trivial bubbleless globally stable steady-state (where the borrowing
constraint is slack).
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 1, for a given value ; as the ratio

 increases, the economy
moves from equilibria in which ﬁnancing constraints are irrelevant to ones in which they are
binding. This result is intuitive. Other things equal, the demand for intangible capital is
increasing in : The higher the ratio

, the more entrepreneurs want to accumulate intangible
capital instead of physical capital. After a certain point, all internal funds are invested in Z,
and ﬁnancing constraints become binding.
As will become clear in the following Sections, Proposition 1 contains the central result
behind our connection between intangible capital accumulation, relative asset shortages, and
bubbles. The increased importance of intangible capital due to technological change, repre-
sented by increases in the ratio


13, moves the economy towards a constrained region of the
13The evidence for which was presented in Section 2.
14parameter space. At this point, the relative supply of stores of value is distorted because
households’ savings can only be allocated to physical capital despite the higher productivity
of intangibles. The over-accumulation of K reduces its marginal productivity and the rate
of interest in the market for funds, which is key for rational bubbles to exist.
4.2 The Bubbly Economy
Let us now analyze the existence of bubbly equilibria.
Deﬁnition. A rational bubble is a security in unit supply which lasts forever, pays no
dividends, and has price B(t)>0 at time t. Moreover, any individual can trade this security
in the market.
The presence of a bubble changes some of the equilibrium conditions outlined above. In
particular, the savings market equilibrium requires that, at each period, there are enough
savings to ﬁnance physical and intangible capital accumulation as well as the acquisition of
the bubbly security:
Kt(t + 1) + Zt(t + 1) + B (t + 1) = (1      )Yt 1 (t + 1) (14)
Because any individual can trade the bubbly security in the market, its rate of return - the
rate at which its price evolves over time - is equalized to the return on the worst investment
opportunities available to investors. This is always given by the return R that households
obtain on their savings. Therefore, in any dynamic equilibrium the value of the rational
bubble evolves according to:
B (t + 1) = R(t + 1)B (t) (15)
In case ﬁnancial frictions are binding, entrepreneurs will never be interested in the bubble,
since their funds are invested at a rate
IRR = R +  > R
Hence, in any constrained equilibrium, the bubble is held in its entirety by the households of
each generation.
At this stage, we establish some notation to facilitate the derivation of the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition. Let
















 (t + 1) =
B (t + 1)
Yt 1 (t + 1)
The ﬁrst three deﬁnitions formalize the usual concept of a variable per eﬃciency unit,
while the last one deﬁnes the bubble per unit of output. Note that we are comparing the
price of the bubble that is exchanged at time t + 1 with the output generated at time t + 1
(by generation t   1).
The next Lemma provides some helpful technical results.
Lemma 2. i) The vector [Yt 1(t+1);B(t+1)] is a state vector for the economy. The vector
[^ Yt 1(t + 1);B(t + 1)] is a state vector as well, given an initial value of technology A(0).
ii) If, at time t, [^ Yt 1(t+1);B(t+1)] belongs to a dynamic equilibrium where (;;;n) 2
NB, the ﬁnancing constraint is slack in the next period.
iii) If, at time t, [^ Yt 1(t+1);B(t+1)] belongs to a dynamic equilibrium where (;;;n) 2
B, there exists a threshold B
max;b such that:
 For B(t + 1)  B
max;b, the ﬁnancing constraint is binding in period t+1.
 For B(t + 1) > B
max;b, the ﬁnancing constraint is slack in period t+1.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the economy is in the NB region, the ﬁnancing constraints are slack along any equilibrium
path. The case where the economy belongs to the B region is more involved. Intuitively, for
small enough bubbles, the ﬁnancing constraint is binding, since the bubble does not drain
too many funds, which means that the stock of capital will be high, inducing entrepreneurs
to fully invest in intangibles. On the other hand, if the bubble is large enough, households
will ﬁnance a small amount of physical capital. In this case, it is in the best interest of
entrepreneurs to invest in K as well, which means that the borrowing constraint becomes
slack.
Based on that, we can characterize in detail the bubbly dynamic equilibria. Let us start
with Proposition 2, which restates Tirole’s (1985) result.
Proposition 2. (Tirole 1985) If the bubbleless steady-state features
IRR + (1   )R < (1 + g) (16)
there exist dynamic bubbly equilibria.
16Whenever the average rate of return of the economy is below its growth rate in the
bubbleless steady-state, rational bubbles can exist. This well known condition has been
traditionally interpreted as a sign of dynamic ineﬃciency, since a low rate of return results
from excessive accumulation of capital. It is important to note that the above Proposition
deﬁnes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of bubbly equilibria in the NB
region - where R is equalized to IRR. In the B region, on the other hand, it is possible for
bubbly equilibria to survive even if the bubbleless steady-state features IRR+(1   )R >
(1 + g) as shown by Farhi and Tirole (2008).
It turns out that in the bubbleless steady-state, the comparison between the average rate
of return and the growth rate of the economy is equivalent to the AMSZ test about the
productivity of the corporate sector. AMSZ compare, at every period, the amount of funds
absorbed by the corporate sector in the form of capital expenditures versus the excess of
its output over labor costs. The authors present strong evidence that the corporate sectors
of OECD economies are highly productive since they generate more funds than what they
absorb. We require our model to satisfy this empirical benchmark.14
Lemma 3. In any bubbleless equilibrium, the economy satisﬁes the AMSZ test if and only if




which is equivalent to a bubbleless steady-state in which:
IRR + (1   )R > (1 + g) (18)
Proof. See Appendix.
In what follows, we characterize the bubbly equilibria in the B region subject to the AMSZ
empirical benchmark, which, for our purposes, deﬁnes the relevant region of the parameter
space. We acknowledge that this restriction implies a counterfactually small share of labor
income relative to output. However, this results from some of the stark assumptions we
have imposed in order to make the model tractable15 and are not directly linked to the most
important aspects of our analysis. We omit the presentation of the dynamic equilibria in the
other regions of the parameter space, since they can be derived in similar ways.
Proposition 3. In the B region with  +  > 1
2, there exist dynamic bubbly equilibria that
14From Proposition 2 it is easy to conclude that this restriction makes it harder for our model to generate
rational bubbles.
15For instance, our assumption of full depreciation of capital is partly responsible for this diﬃculty.
17converge to a steady-state in which
B
 = (1      )(1   )    (19)
and the borrowing constraint is binding at all times, as long as B > 0. There also exist
dynamic equilibria such that the bubble-to-output ratio is always non-negative but converges
to zero over time.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 represents graphically the relevant regions of the parameter space in terms of 
and , for given  and n. The B/NB line has slope 
1 , and divides the space  into the B
and NB regions.
Proposition 3 nicely extends and qualiﬁes the result of Proposition 1 - about bubbleless
equilibria - to bubbly equilibrium paths, by identifying an additional division of the parameter
space, related to the AMSZ line. This line separates economies in which the AMSZ benchmark
is satisﬁed ( +   1
2) from those in which it is not.
The dynamics of the bubbly equilibrium paths can be described as follows. In the region
where the economy’s average rate of return is low relative to its growth rate, i.e. below
the AMSZ line, all of Tirole’s (1985) standard results apply, whether the constraint binds
or not. There can be bubbles that disappear asymptotically and bubbles that grow forever
together with the economy. We do not focus on this area in our study, since it contradicts
the empirical evidence.
In the area above the AMSZ line, the separation between NB and B deﬁnes the dynamics
of the bubbly equilibria, just like in the case of the bubbleless equilibria. In the blue area of
the B region, the bubbleless steady-state features R < (1+g). This condition guarantees that
there exist equilibrium paths in which the bubble-to-output ratio is positive but disappears
asymptotically, as well as equilibrium paths that converge to a steady-state with a positive
bubble-to-output ratio. In all bubbly paths the ﬁnancing constraints are binding. In the rest
of the B region and in the whole NB region, instead, no rational bubbles can be sustained in
equilibrium.
Figures 3 represents the dynamics of the economy in the B region, above the AMSZ line,
for B > 0. The red line represents the bubbleless equilibrium path, that converges to the
bubbleless steady-state (red dot). All the other equilibrium paths have a positive bubble.
They either converge to the bubbleless steady-state (the bubble disappears asymptotically),
or they reach the bubbly steady-state through a saddle path, where the bubble is constant
as a fraction of output.
184.3 Stochastic Bubbles
The previous results can be extended to the case of stochastic bubbles. In order to prove
that, we consider an environment in which, at every period, the rational bubble survives
with probability p or bursts with probability 1   p as in the classic model of Blanchard and
Watson (1982). Naturally, as long as the bubble exists, it has to grow at a rate R
p, so its
expected return is equal to R.
Let us start with the deﬁnition of a conditional steady-state.
Deﬁnition. A conditional steady-state is an allocation such that a stochastic bubble ex-
ists and then bursts at some point. While the bubble exists, all variables in the economy n
^ Yt (t + 2); ^ Kt (t + 1); ^ Zt (t + 1);B (t + 1)
o
are constant. After the bubble bursts, the econ-
omy converges to a bubbleless steady-state as shown in subsection 4.1.
Naturally, unless the economy starts at the conditional steady-state, it will almost surely
not reach it, since the probability of that event happening converges to zero. The conditional
steady-state is, notwithstanding, a useful benchmark because it allows us to determine the
trajectory of a bubbly economy while the bubble lasts. In what follows, we characterize,
through a series of propositions, the dynamics of the economy when bubbles are stochastic.
We will focus on the case where the stochastic bubble has not burst until the most recent
period, since the dynamics of the economy after the bubble bursts have been already explored
in Section 4.1.
Lemma 4. Along any bubbly path with initial condition [Yt 1 (t + 1);B (t + 1)], all the results
in Lemma 2 hold.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 highlights that the dynamics of the economy are not materially aﬀected by the
stochastic nature of bubbles. Whether the continuation is binding or not depends only on
the bubble-to-output ratio and the region of the parameter space where the economy lies.
Proposition 4. There are no stochastic bubbly equilibria in the NB region if AMSZ is sat-
isﬁed.
Proof. See Appendix.
As before, economies that are productive in the AMSZ sense cannot sustain stochastic
bubbly equilibria if they are in the NB region of the parameter space.
19Proposition 5. In the B region with  +  > 1
2, there exist dynamic bubbly equilibria that
converge to a conditional steady-state in which
B




and the borrowing constraint is binding at all times, as long as B > 0. There also exist
dynamic equilibria such that the bubble-to-output ratio is always non-negative but converges
to zero over time.
Proof. See Appendix.
These results show that economies that satisfy the AMSZ criterion can sustain stochastic
bubbles. Obviously, the conditions for the existence of stochastic bubbles are more stringent
relative to the deterministic case. As mentioned before, conditional on not bursting, stochas-
tic bubbles grow at the rate
R(t+1)
p > R(t + 1). Hence, for these bubbles to not outgrow the
economy in ﬁnite time, equilibrium interest rates in the bubbleless equilibrium have to be
even lower compared to the economy’s growth rate in the long-run (the more so the higher
the chance the bubble will burst). This can achieved by having a ratio

 high enough and
binding ﬁnancing contraints.
5 Intangible Capital, Technological Change, and Bubbles
Having developed the technical results on the dynamics of our model economy, we now provide
intuition about the link between bubbles and the importance of intangible capital.16 The
analysis also considers the case of stochastic technological change, as well as the relationship
between technological progress, the global savings glut, and bubbles.
5.1 The Importance of Intangible Capital and Bubbles
The results in Section 4 show that economies which satisfy the AMSZ condition can sustain
bubbles only if intangible capital is suﬃciently important in the production process. With a
16Our connection between bubbles and technological changes is also diﬀerent from the work of Pastor and
Veronesi (2008), which is not based on ﬁnancial frictions. The authors develop a model where the interaction
between technological evolution and learning in ﬁnancial markets induces asset prices to display bubble-
like behavior. However, as the authors argue, this is misleading since, in their model, the market value of
traded securities reﬂects fundamentals conditional on the information available to investors. In our model,
on the other hand, there is no learning. The technological shift allows the bubbly security to have a positive
market price despite its fundamental value being zero at every period. Moreover, the asset shortage approach
highlighted here is absent in their work.
20high  relative to , ﬁnancing constraints are active, and the equilibrium interest rate is low
– which allows rational bubbles to be sustained in equilibrium.
To better illustrate the point, we calibrate the model17 and calculate the steady-state
rates of return and growth rate of the bubbleless economy for diﬀerent values of  and .
In this exercise, the fraction of income that goes to intangible capital  is increased by 15
percentage points, while  is decreased by 12 percentage points, the remaining 3 percentage
points being taken from labor in order to preserve constant returns to scale. This calibration
mimics the change in the share of output accruing to the diﬀerent factors documented for
the US in the last 30 years by Corrado et al. (2006). Figure 4 shows how the bubbleless
steady-state rates R and IRR shift as  gradually increases and at the same time  decreases
– the horizontal axis representing the change in . It also compares the growth rate of the
economy 1 + g with the equilibrium average rate of return, (1   )R + IRR.18
The green vertical threshold separates the NB region (left) from the B region (right). For
small values of , the economy is in the NB region. The returns on tangible and intangible
capital are equalized, so that R = IRR. Since the AMSZ condition is satisﬁed, R > 1 + g
in the steady-state, and no bubbles can exist. For larger values of

, on the other hand, the
economy is in the B region. The wedge between R and IRR increases with

 and might drive




 we calibrate here represents a simple comparative statics exercise, but its
implications are identical to an unexpected and exogenous technological shift in the economy.
In particular, suppose that the economy is originally in the NB region of the parameter space,
and satisﬁes the AMSZ condition. No bubble can exist at this time, and the economy is on a
bubbleless path. Suppose all agents originally expect technology to be constant forever, but,
at a certain time T, (;) suddenly shifts to (0;0) such that (0 + 0) > 0:5 – ensuring
the new economy satisﬁes the AMSZ condition as well. Finally, suppose no more changes
are due. The arrow in Figure 5 represents this shift in the space of (;). Under these
assumptions, we can prove the following:
Proposition 6. For any value of (0 + 0) 2 (0:5;1), there exist parameters (0;0) with
0
0
large enough which allow for the creation of a bubble at the beginning of T. Before time T,
there can be no bubbles.
Proof. See Appendix.
17Further details of the calibration are reported in the Appendix.
18Note that in our calibration the economy always satisﬁes the AMSZ test, since the average rate – the
dotted line – is always above 1 + g.
21This Proposition shows that bubbly equilibria can arise upon technological innovation.
In the proof, we consider the case in which the entrepreneurs of generation T   1 are the
ones who issue the bubbly security, selling it to the households of the same generation at the
beginning of date T. The dynamics of the economy change, and (depending on the size of
the bubble that is created) the economy will jump to one of the bubbly paths depicted in
Figure 3.
The issuance of a bubble by the entrepreneurs has three eﬀects. First, it immediately
alleviates the ﬁnancing constraints of the existing entrepreneurs, reducing distortions in cap-
ital allocation and directly beneﬁting all individuals from generation T   1. Second, there
is a positive spillover impact on future generations since the increased production raises la-
bor income, relaxing future ﬁnancing constraints as well. Because of decreasing returns to
capital, though, its importance dies out over time. Finally, there is a competition eﬀect: as
the bubble grows, it competes for funds with the entrepreneurs, and therefore has a negative
impact on the accumulation of capital and production of future generations.19
5.2 Stochastic Technological Progress and Bubbles
In this subsection, we extend the analysis above and investigate the case in which agents
anticipate that technological change can occur with a certain probability. In particular, we
demonstrate that even the possibility of experiencing a technological change which increases
 relative to  is already enough to allow for bubbly equilibria. Interestingly, bubbles can
arise even if the economy is originally in the NB region and if it satisﬁes the AMSZ at all
times.
Consider an economy that, as long as technological change has not occurred yet, belongs
to the NB region of the parameter space and also satisﬁes the AMSZ condition. At every
period, there is a probability q > 0 that technological progress will take place, changing
the original parameters of the production function (;) to new values (0;0). Once this
happens, no further changes occur and the economy becomes completely deterministic. The
new speciﬁcation (0;0) belongs to the B region and also satisﬁes the AMSZ criterion –
(0 + 0 > 0:5). Additionally, we assume that entrepreneurs know exactly their technology
at the time they make investment decisions. Hence, if technological change has not taken
place until the beginning of period t + 1, for example, the middle-aged entrepreneurs of
generation t will produce with the old technology and uncertainty might only aﬀect the
entrepreneurs of future generations. Under these assumptions, we can prove the following:
19This is easy to verify by looking at the equation of equilibrium in the savings market, from which it is
clear that the bubble subtracts resources to the investment in the two types of capital.
22Proposition 7. For any value of (0 + 0) 2 (0:5;1), there exist parameters (0;0) with
0
0
large enough to allow for bubbly equilibria.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the situation described above, the probability of the economy experiencing techno-
logical progress is positive and constant at all times until the change takes place. As a
consequence, technological progress occurs with probability 1 in the long-run. If
0
0 is large
enough, thus, the steady-state will feature low interest rates almost surely. We can show,
however, that bubbles may arise even if there is uncertainty about interest rates in the long-
run. To see that, let us assume a similar model as before, but suppose that the permanent
technological progress occurs with probability q > 0 at the very beginning of time T only,
where T is a future period. For any other date, q = 0 and there is no uncertainty. Under
those assumptions, we can prove the following:
Proposition 8. For any value of (0 + 0) 2 (0:5;1), there exist parameters (0;0) with
0
0
large enough to allow for bubbly equilibria such that:
i) if technological change does not occur at date T, the bubble immediately bursts and
the economy converges to the bubbleless steady-state thereafter.
ii) if technological change occurs at date T, the bubble is positive at all times.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 8 illustrates how the stochastic nature of bubbles might be purely linked to
the randomness of technological progress. If there is a technological “disappointment” and
the production structure is unchanged at time T, the bubble immediately bursts.
The intuition for the results in Propositions 6-8 is straightforward. If technological
progress shifts the production function to be heavily biased towards intangibles relative to
physical capital, it will move the economy to a region of the parameter space where the
bubbleless steady-state features binding ﬁnancing constraints and very low interest rates,
despite high IRR – as illustrated by the red arrow in Figure 5. This change allows for the
co-existence of bubbles and eﬃciency. Interestingly, the very possibility of such a change is
already suﬃcient to generate paths with a positive bubble even before the technological shift
takes place.
5.3 Relation to the Savings Glut Explanation
One recent alternative explanation for asset price bubbles is based on the so called “savings
glut” phenomenon – see Bernanke (2005). It points to the fast development of emerging
23markets like China and oil-exporting countries, that have large amounts of savings but are
unable to supply sound stores of value due to underdeveloped domestic ﬁnancial markets.
The excess funds from these countries have ﬂooded the capital markets of developed nations,
putting downward pressure on interest rates and stimulating the appearance of speculative
bubbles. Besides identifying a separate underlying story for the emergence of bubbles in
developed economies, our model diﬀers from the savings glut explanation along two main
dimensions.
First, our model hinges on a relative imbalance of high-yield versus low-yield assets in
developed economies – a surplus of K and a shortage of Z – rather than on an absolute lack
of sound stores of value. While the latter is certainly reasonable for developing countries, it
seems less relevant for developed nations. If anything, one would expect that, as economies
develop, their capacity to create stores of value increases. In this case, more securities can
be issued and more accumulation of capital would be possible.
Second, most of the models that attribute the emergence of rational bubbles to an in-
crease in the supply of funds feature a single-factor economy (physical capital), with linear
technology (AK) and limited pledgeability of output. The linearity assumption, however, is
not innocuous. With limited pledgeability of output, as new funds enter the economy capital
keeps accumulating, albeit at a lower level than it would be possible without frictions. In an
economy where physical capital has decreasing marginal returns, this accumulation would in
fact lower the internal rate of return of funds. This means that, at some point, the economy
would have a low enough productivity of capital to fail the AMSZ test, thereby rendering
it inconsistent with the available evidence. The assumption of linear technology shuts down
this channel and keeps the internal return on funds artiﬁcially high.
In our framework, however, the savings glut explanation reinforces the technology-based
approach. In the latter, the separation between the two types of capital allows the accumu-
lation of physical capital to actually increase the wedge between R and IRR: the marginal
productivity of physical capital decreases, while the marginal productivity of intangible capi-
tal increases. To the extent that foreign investors cannot overcome the moral hazard frictions
in the domestic economy, an inﬂow of funds from abroad increases the stock of K and pushes
the IRR up. This allows the AMSZ condition to be satisﬁed even for very low interest
rates.20 We formalize this intuition through a stylized example of an open economy pre-
sented in the Appendix.
20Interestingly, for our eﬀects to take place, there is no need for global savings to increase. As physical
capital becomes less attractive due to technological change, even a stable amount of total savings is capable
of pushing interest rates down. Hence, our results do not contradict Laibson and Mollerstrom (2009) who
argue that there is no global savings glut since global investment has not increased as a fraction of global
GDP since mid 1990s.
246 Dynamic Eﬃciency
6.1 Traditional Tests of Dynamic Eﬃciency
As discussed in Section 4, bubbly equilibria can exist even if the economy satisﬁes the AMSZ
empirical benchmark. In AMSZ’s original paper as well as in Tirole (1985), this restriction
corresponds to the condition that the equilibrium interest rate is not below the growth rate
of the economy in the long-run, which has been been traditionally interpreted as a sign of
dynamic eﬃciency. In particular, in that setting the following three statements are equivalent:
1. The economy satisﬁes the AMSZ condition.
2. The interest rate is higher than the growth rate of the economy in the long-run.
3. The economy is dynamically eﬃcient.
In the presence of frictions, however, the equivalence of these statements is broken. For
instance, in a similar environment, Farhi and Tirole (2008) have shown that statements 1
and 2 are delinked. We extend their analysis by proving that, in our model, statements 1
and 3 are not equivalent either. Moreover, we qualify the relation between 1 and 2. While
our results are derived under a stylized setting, they allow us to make the general point that,
by creating heterogeneity in investment opportunities, ﬁnancial constraints can decisively
inﬂuence the validity of traditional tests of dynamic eﬃciency.21
Lemma 3 formalizes the connection between the AMSZ restriction and rates of return.
Note that as long as  +   1
2, the AMSZ test will be satisﬁed. This does not, however,
guarantee that the interest rate condition will be met at all times, since Lemma 3 only
holds in the steady-state. Nonetheless, analyzing steady-states is central since they contain
important information about the eﬃciency properties of allocations.
We now formally prove that the AMSZ test is not suﬃcient to guarantee the eﬃciency of
allocations once ﬁnancial frictions are taken into account. For this purpose, it is important
to discuss the dimensions a planner could act on in order to look for potential improvements
over market allocations.
A benevolent planner can operate on at least two margins. First, whenever the borrow-
ing constraints bind, the planner can make intra-generational transfers from unconstrained
households to constrained entrepreneurs. This, however, has no major implications for the
topic of dynamic eﬃciency, since it does not address the issue of over or under-accumulation
of capital. Much more interesting, though, is to consider improvements in the intertemporal
margin while respecting existing borrowing constraints.
21We do not attempt to derive an exact test of eﬃciency since our set up is too simpliﬁed, and any rules
would probably not apply in more general contexts.
25Deﬁnition. An allocation is constrained eﬃcient if it cannot be Pareto improved by a planner
who is not allowed to transfer resources from the unconstrained households to the constrained
entrepreneurs of a given generation.
Based on the original literature on dynamic eﬃciency, one could expect that the con-
strained eﬃciency requirement would coincide with the AMSZ test. The following proposition
proves that this is not the case.
Proposition 9. If ﬁnancial frictions are binding, the AMSZ criterion is not a suﬃcient
condition to guarantee constrained eﬃciency.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason why the AMSZ criterion does not guarantee eﬃciency in our model is related
to the heterogeneity of investment opportunities created by ﬁnancial frictions. In the binding
region of the parameter space, there is a wedge between the interest rate obtained by the
creditors and the rate of return earned by entrepreneurs. Looking at the average rate of return
in the economy – as in the AMSZ test – is not suﬃcient to judge the eﬃciency property of
market allocations, because there might be over-accumulation among those who cannot park
funds on productive assets. The social planner can improve an allocation by transferring
funds across households from diﬀerent generations, compensating all entrepreneurs along the
way. This can be done even if the growth rate of the economy is lower than the average rate
of return, as long as it is greater than R.
One could argue, though, that our suggested transfer scheme does not do justice to the
AMSZ test. On the one hand, we do not allow the planner to overcome the ineﬃciency
resulting from moral hazard, but on the other hand, she is allowed to identify the diﬀerent
groups according to their investment opportunities and target them for reallocation purposes.
To address this criticism, we analyze the eﬃciency properties of allocations that satisfy the
AMSZ test in a setting where the planner cannot target speciﬁc groups.
Deﬁnition. An allocation is blind constrained eﬃcient if it cannot be Pareto improved by a
planner who can only transfer resources across generations without identifying households or
entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, even when we consider only blind reallocations, it is still the case that the
AMSZ benchmark does not coincide with eﬃciency, this time for the opposite reason: there
exist allocations that do not satisfy the AMSZ benchmark, but cannot be improved by a
blind social planner.
Proposition 10. If ﬁnancial frictions are binding, the failure to satisfy the AMSZ criterion
is not a suﬃcient condition to guarantee that an allocation is not blind constrained eﬃcient.
26Proof. The proof mimics the proof of Proposition 1 in AMSZ, taking into account that be-
cause IRR > R, in any intertemporal transfer scheme entrepreneurs should be compensated
more than households, which forces the planner to transfer IRR to both groups (since she
cannot distinguish between them).
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The AMSZ test compares the average
rate of return on the economy with its growth rate in the long-run. However, a planner trying
to improve over market allocations who cannot target speciﬁc groups in society is required
to transfer resources over time at the highest rate of return every period. This is the only
way to ensure that those who face the best investment opportunities are not harmed by
reallocations. Hence, the fact that the economy fails the AMSZ test does not imply there are
feasible improvements for blind planners, unless IRR < (1 + g) in steady-state.
6.2 Normative and Positive Implications in a Bubbly Economy
The previous subsections have shown that it is possible for the economy to satisfy the AMSZ
benchmark while being ineﬃcient. Moreover, Sections 4 and 5 demonstrated that the econ-
omy can sustain bubbly equilibria even if we impose the AMSZ condition. A natural question,
therefore, is whether rational bubbles are capable of restoring eﬃciency. As in Farhi and Ti-
role (2008), we argue this is not the case in general.
To see that, consider an economy where borrowing constraints bind. In this context,
the introduction of a rational bubble has redistributive eﬀects that aﬀect negatively some
individuals. On the one hand, bubbles improve the investment opportunities of savers. On
the other hand, as the bubble grows, it competes for funds with entrepreneurs who borrow
resources to make real investments in future periods. Therefore, typical rational bubbles are
not Pareto improving in our model.
From a practical perspective, the present paper suggests one natural approach to mitigate
the relative shortage of assets and prevent the emergence of bubbles: to improve the pledge-
ability of future cash ﬂows, particularly those stemming from activities that are intensive in
intangible capital. The increased pledgeability of future output allows funds to be allocated
to their most productive ends, increasing the productivity in the overall economy and raising
the rate of return faced by outside investors. This is crucial to preempt the emergence of new
bubbles. Policies targeted to strengthen property rights and the enforcement of contracts
are obvious candidates to achieve this goal. So are measures that facilitate investments in
education and human capital which tend to be productive, but in general are subject to
important ﬁnancing constraints.
277 Conclusion
Following the emerging literature on asset shortages, we believe that one of the structural
causes of endless speculation in ﬁnancial markets around the globe is the inability of the
world economy to properly supply the stores of value necessary to accommodate the increased
wealth it has generated. Caballero et al. (2008) point to the developing world as a source of
imbalances in the supply and demand for assets. The present paper suggests that developed
countries might have played a signiﬁcant role in this process as well. Our analysis stresses
that one important element favoring asset price bubbles in developed countries is not an
absolute lack of stores of value, but rather a diﬃculty in generating high-yield assets relative
to low-yield ones.
Acknowledging this tendency of the global economy to induce asset price bubbles is of
utmost importance for policymakers and academics. In an environment in which bubbles
bridge the gap between high and low-yield securities and alleviate ﬁnancial distortions, it
might be useless or even harmful to try to chase and prick them. Hence, the best strategy
for central banks might be to smoothly manage high valuation episodes, curbing excessive
speculation without triggering huge drops in asset prices. We believe that checking the
accuracy of these statements in formal models of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy might
be a very interesting research topic.
The mechanism described in this paper identiﬁes one potential structural cause of bubbles,
but as economies develop and change other forces may become more or less important at the
same time. For example, the pledgeability of tangible capital itself may be much lower in
developing economies than in developed ones – so that for developing countries that might
be the main source of frictions. At the same time, even among developed economies, the
degree of pledgeability of intangible capital will vary. As nations develop better instruments
to transfer ownership of intangible capital (for example, a more eﬃcient patent system), the
eﬀective pledgeability of intangibles will improve, mitigating the frictions that in our model
are at the source of the existence of rational bubbles. This interaction between technological
and institutional progress is an interesting topic for future studies.
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31Tables
Conventional, without intangibles Including intangibles
Shares of total income
Labor 70.4 60.0
Tangible capital 29.6 25.0
Intangible capital 15.0
Table 1: Shares of income to factor, non-farm business sector, 2000-2003, including and
excluding intangible capital (from Corrado et al. 2006, Table 4)
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Figure 2: Characterization of the parameter space
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Figure 5: Steady states and technological transition
the two sectors aggregate in a supermodular way), what we called the IRR.
At some point of the transition, the interest rate R falls below the growth rate of the
economy 1+g, and the conditions for rational bubbles are created, while the economy is still
dynamically e cient.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the bubbleless steady state. In Figure 6 and 7 we calibrate
an example of a discrete technological change and plot the full dynamics of the transition
towards the new steady state. We calibrate the economy to switch from the NB region to the
B region (a change from the left to the right of the threshold in Figure 5). The calibration
has again the economy always dynamically e cient and the B region corresponds to the case
of Figure 3, so the dynamics in these region have the ﬁnancing constraint always binding.
Before the technological change, no bubbles can exist, because the economy falls exactly
in the case of Tirole (1985): there are no active frictions and the economy is dynamically
e cient. The economy must be on a converging bubbleless equilibrium path, along the red
line. After the technological change, the dynamics are those of Figure 3.
Figure 7 plots a thought experiment in which at a certain point in time T, while the econ-
omy is in the NB, low-technology steady state, unanticipated news arrives that a technological
change is going to happen at time T + s, and therefore the dynamics will change from time
T + s on.
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Figure 5: Technological change
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